Yaakov Lappin

The Long-Term Competition doctrine – Israel’s theory of victory vs Iran

By Yaakov Lappin

In May this year, Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the former deputy chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, published an important paper that provides a glimpse into a new doctrine increasingly shaping the Israeli defense establishment’s view on how to deal with Iran.

In the paper, published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Zamir, laid out a concept known as Long-Term Competition (LTC), and, specifically, how Israel should apply it to take on the threat posed by Iran.

Iran, Zamir pointed out, is dedicated to the long-term goal of destroying Israel and becoming the regional hegemonic power. It seeks to achieve this by creating heavily-armed proxies and partners, surrounding Israel with rings of rocket and missile bases, and placing a nuclear umbrella over this tightening noose.

Citing the American foreign policy scholar Hal Brands, Zamir noted that any LTC doctrine must include a theory of victory – meaning defining a state’s long-term strategic goal and how it plans to achieve it.

Other key tenets of an LTC include leveraging one’s asymmetric advantage, embracing ideological competition, competing comprehensively and holistically, operating multilaterally, and exploiting “the strategic importance of time.”

Ultimately, a country engaged in an LTC against an adversary must pace itself for the long haul.

Zamir proposed that Israel’s LTC against Iran apply seven core principles, which are as follows:

·         A multilateral, long-term campaign organized regionally in which roles and players (meaning other states in the Middle East also threatened by Iran) are clearly defined.

·         Targeting the Iranian Islamic Republican Guards Corps, in Iran and throughout the Middle East. The IRGC was defined by Zamir as Iran’s “center of gravity,” and weakening it means undermining Tehran’s regional influence

·         Denying the ability of Iran to operate indirectly, through proxies, by responding to such actions with direct deterrent reprisals – meaning targeting Iran directly for the actions of its proxies.

·         Hitting targets belonging to Iran’s proxies continuously.

·         Applying direct pressure on the Iranian regime due to its terrorist actions whether a nuclear agreement is signed or not.

·         Expanding Israel’s deniable shadow war actions, currently active against Iranian interests in Syria, to target the whole of the Iranian regime, the IRGC, and regional Iranian assets.

·         And waging an “ideological cultural” campaign to win over Middle Eastern hearts and minds among sects, tribes, and other populations to highlight the advantages of moderate Islam and democracy, with Shi’ite communities being the prime target audience.

Signs that this doctrine is increasingly shaping the Israel defense establishment’s thinking have been emerging steadily over the last few years. In 2021, Maj. Gen. Tal Kelman, head of the IDF’s Strategy and Third Circle Directorate (a reference to countries in Israel's third-circle periphery with Iran being the focal point), which was founded in June 2020, told the Hebrew daily Maariv newspaper, “The Shi’ite axis is expanding, and Iran is engaged in a long-term strategic competition with us. The incredible thing is that despite the heavy prices paid by Iranian citizens… the internal-economic low, which is perhaps the worst in Iran since its war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran continues to strive to implement its strategy.” 

Thus, Iran is engaged in a long-term campaign aimed at Israel’s eventual demise, and the response by Israel’s defense establishment is an Israeli long-term campaign designed to thwart all of the Iranian regime’s strategic goals and to contribute to its weakness, with the end goal being defined by Zamir as “the extended isolation and weakening of the enemy until its surrender, where surrender equals the defeated camp being forced to accept its enemy’s terms and losing its motivation to continue fighting given the high cost of the campaign.”

This view was echoed by Kelman, who stated last year, “The significance of the campaign against Iran is not that, in the end, I conquer Tehran and plant a flag there, but a campaign in which I cause Iran to pay very heavy prices, harm its centers of gravity, military capabilities, force it to pay a significant economic price for its aggressive conduct against the State of Israel,” he stated.

Such an Israeli campaign needs to play out across multiple sectors simultaneously, such as Syria, Iran itself, and other locations, and it must become Israel’s top priority, Kelman argued. “Part of the reason that for the past ten years we have been engaged in a campaign between wars in Syria [to roll back Iran’s entrenchment there] and not allowing Iran to build a Hezbollah-like organization there is exactly this,” he stated.

Previous conversations this author held with sources from the IDF’s Strategy and Third Circle Directorate found that the IDF has adopted a comprehensive, holistic view of developing challenges to Israel from Iran, and is assembling ‘puzzle pieces’ that were once seen separately to form a complete picture of threat. The picture begins on Iranian soil and reaches the borders of Israel (in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza) through an integrated lens, rather than viewing each incident or sector isolation.

"Against this, we have to develop a range of capabilities – both to be ready at any minute for any development and also for the other side to be sufficiently deterred – and to know that Israel has the ability to respond unequivocally to any action or desire by the enemy," a source from the Directorate told me in 2020.

Zamir’s paper published in May this year seeks to take this LTC doctrine to the next stage and to bring moderate Sunni powers on board this struggle.

“More than ever before, the anti-Iran nations of the Middle East together with the United States must formulate a joint smart strategy to confront the geopolitical and regional changes appropriately,” Zamir stated. The fact that China and Russia are engaged in intense great power competition with the United States over the global order will also directly influence the Middle East and the long-term struggle in the region between the Islamic Republic’s radical axis and the anti-Iran bloc, he argued.

“The United States is the enemy of the Iranian regime, which views it as the Great Satan. The regime plans to seize control of the Middle East; the global power it intends to partner with is China. The strengthening of this strategic partnership was signaled in March 2021 when China and Iran signed an agreement of economic and security cooperation agreement that includes significant Chinese investments in Iran in exchange for a twenty-five-year supply of oil, which is so critical to the Chinese economy,” said Zamir.

He added that in the military field, China-Iran cooperation is growing, including the transfer of military technologies and advanced Chinese weapons deals, while at the same time, Iran’s navy holds joint exercises and maneuvers with the navies of China and Russia.

Zamir called on Israel to set itself the target of weakening Iran and its deterrence capabilities, denying it the ability to use its forces and resources to destabilize the region, and curbing its expansion to regional states, before forcing it to withdraw.

The contours of the Iranian and Israeli long-term competition doctrines are becoming clear; and while Israel’s campaign is motivated entirely by defensive requirements, the campaign will likely increasingly focus on the need to go on the attack beyond Syria, and to onboard new allies wherever possible.


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Israel must beware of dangerous delusions after Gaza conflict

By Yaakov Lappin

The ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad appears to be holding stable, creating an opportunity to review the key takeaways from the three-day round of fighting from August 5 to August 7.

The Israeli defense establishment conducted a highly successful and effective short, sharp shock to the Iranian-backed PIJ terror faction. Yet it is the weakest of Israel’s adversaries, and the Israeli public needs to manage its expectations accordingly.

Acting on intelligence of an imminent guided missile attack from Gaza on Israeli targets, the Israeli Air Force, the Shin Bet, the Military Intelligence Directorate, Southern Command, and the IDF Armored Corps integrated their firepower efforts in a coordinated opening strike, which eliminated PIJ’s senior military leadership in northern Gaza, PIJ field attack squads, and PIJ observation towers used to coordinate enemy activity -- all at the same time.

The Israeli operational momentum continued throughout the operation, with precision strikes displaying a marriage of accurate firepower and real-time intelligence superiority.

Meanwhile, on the defensive side, Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system broke its previous records and achieved a 97% successful interception rate of rockets heading for built-up areas. Standing guard over Israeli cities, towns, and villages, the Iron Dome intercepted 380 projectiles.

The conflict was fought entirely as an exchange of standoff firepower, with both sides sending firepower strikes at one another. PIJ directed 1,100 rockets indiscriminately at Israeli targets, while the IAF took the utmost care to reduce harm to noncombatants to the extent possible, including aborting strikes when civilians were spotted in the designated strike zone.

According to IDF figures, 15 Palestinians were killed by failed PIJ rockets, meaning that more Palestinian civilians were killed by PIJ than by Israel in this conflict.

The IDF attacked a total of 170 PIJ targets during the three days of fighting, also going on to eliminate the organization’s southern commander.

It is easy to become deluded by the effective defense of the Israeli home front during this conflict, and easy to forget that should Hamas get involved, with its significantly larger arsenal of rockets, or Hezbollah, which has a monstrous arsenal of 150,000 projectiles – larger than that of most NATO armies --  air defenses will be flooded and will only be partially effective in preventing impacts in Israel.

More importantly, it is important to view Gaza as Iran sees it: One more arena in a multi-arena choke hold that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is trying to wrap around Israel’s neck.

By financing and providing knowhow to Gaza’s terror factions to build rocket arsenals and adding their firepower to that of Hezbollah, together with its entrenchment in Syria where it has ballistic and cruise missile bases, as well as its deployment of missiles and UAVs to Iraq and missile launch sites in Iran itself, the Islamic Republic is building a region-wide multi-front firepower assault staging ground against Israel.

This is the true context in which Gaza should be viewed. The three-day clash with the second largest Gazan terror faction is therefore no indication of the real security challenges faced by Israel.

It is precisely because of this force build-up by the Iranian-led axis, and the alarming progress of Iran’s nuclear program, that Israel’s defense establishment views Gaza as a third-tier priority, and one which must not act as a distraction or drain on Israeli military resources through a large-scale conflict.

Ultimately, however, although it is a mistake to view Gaza in isolation from the wider strategic picture, Israel is still overdue for a more in-depth discussion on its available options regarding the Gaza Strip conundrum.

Israel has two main strategic options when it comes to the Hamas-ruled Islamist enclave: Rounds of fighting designed to create periods of calm and quiet, or re-occupation of the Gaza Strip and a years-long military operation to root out the terrorists that would result in large numbers of casualties and a military regime imposed on 2.2 million Palestinians.

There are no other visible options at this time, and the Israeli defense establishment has repeatedly concluded that limited campaigns to top up Israeli deterrence are the lesser of the two evils.

This is a legitimate and critical debate for Israelis to engage in and those who advocate for toppling the Hamas regime must answer the question of who they think can replace it.

The idea of getting the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority to ‘ride into Gaza on Israeli tanks’ appears to be lacking in credibility, both because of the legitimacy crash that this would cause Fatah, and because of the severe doubts that exist over Fatah’s ability to hold Gaza, after losing the enclave to Hamas in a violent coup in 2007.

If Israel does continue to choose to allow Hamas to rule the Strip, meaning an acceptance of a cycle of enemy force build-up and habitual rounds of fighting, it must also think about ways of strengthening the status of the shaky Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, to avoid giving Palestinians the impression that Hamas’s way of armed conflict and radical Islamism will promote Palestinian interests and national prestige more than the PA’s modus operandi.

The PA’s ‘hybrid’ model of pursuing quiet security coordination with Israel against the common foe of Hamas and PIJ, together with diplomatic assaults on Israel and nods to martyrdom culture and incitement, will be insufficient to compete with Hamas if the PA does not soon begin delivering some political achievements for the Palestinians living under its rule. Those achievements can then act as a lever for Israeli demands for the PA to tone down its incitement.


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Iran’s nuclear program is creeping towards a dangerous twilight zone

By Yaakov Lappin

The May 22 assassination in Tehran of a key Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps officer, who reportedly was busy plotting attacks on Israelis abroad, is a reminder of the fact that the Iranian regime poses a clear and present danger to the security of Israelis, and the wider Middle East.

Seeking regional hegemony, and a great ‘Shi’ite revival,’ the Islamist regime in Tehran has utilized its IRGC’s Quds Force, an elite, secretive international unit that traffics weapons, funds, and training to Iran’s terrorist proxies in the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, armed Shi’ite militias in Syria and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. Iran is turning these entities into some of the most heavily armed non-state actors in the world, complete with arsenals of surface-to-surface firepower. Hezbollah’s inventory dwarfs the firepower of many standard armies.

The Quds Force actively plots attacks on Israeli targets, as well as threatening moderate Sunni states in the region, among them Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Strategic targets of these countries, such as airports, oil refineries, and military bases come under routine attack.

But an even more significant threat – the most critical of them all – that emanates from Iran has all but vanished from the headlines. One can be forgiven for thinking that the Iranian nuclear program is not the gravest issue currently facing the Middle East (as well as constituting a potential flashpoint with global ramifications).

Yet that is exactly what Iran’s nuclear program is. It has become the elephant in the room: A problem too big to be discussed daily outside of defense establishments, and an issue that is ‘falling between the cracks,’ subject to neither diplomatic solutions nor military operations. Instead, a creeping nuclear breakout is underway.

A nuclear-armed Iran, or even a threshold state, would provide a nuclear umbrella over the entire Iranian-led radical axis, accelerating destabilization in the region, emboldening Iran and its Islamist partners to step up attacks on Israel and Sunni states, and sparking a regional nuclear arms race in which Sunni states rush to obtain nuclear weapons, refusing to live under an Iranian nuclear shadow without a suitable reply.

With nuclear negotiations between Iran and world powers led by the United States currently stuck, the Iranian nuclear program is hovering in a bizarre twilight zone, in a no-man's-land that is not subject to regular public discussion or significant international scrutiny.

Meanwhile, Iran is racing ahead. According to a recent statement by Israel Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Iran already has 60 kilograms of uranium enriched to the 60% level, putting it just weeks away from having enough enriched uranium for its first bomb.

This does not mean that Iran is weeks away from having an operational nuclear weapon. Other aspects of the program, like building a nuclear warhead, learning how to place it on a missile, and completing the process to build a nuclear explosive mechanism appear to be frozen at this time.

These additional processes, collectively known as “the weapons group,” would need another year and a half to two years to reach fruition. But the uranium enrichment process is the most difficult aspect of building the bomb, and Iran’s nuclear scientists have all but mastered it.

Iran is building and installing centrifuges that enrich uranium much faster than its first-generation centrifuges did. Some of these new centrifuges have been placed in a recently built underground hall at the Natanz uranium site. A second site, in Fordow, also hosts advanced centrifuges, known as IR-6 type centrifuges.

According to Iranian state television, in March, the IRGC detected and foiled an Israeli sabotage plot to attack the site at Fordow, which is buried in a mountain.

According to international media reports, Natanz was attacked twice by sabotage operations, once in July 2020, and again in April 2021, with the second reported attack taking out Natanz’s centrifuges. In June, a mysterious blast targeted a centrifuge factory at Karaj, near Tehran.

If Israel is indeed conducting covert operations to attack Iran’s nuclear program, these are having a delaying influence, but Iran can and does bounce back, building back its program with new and improved uranium enrichment facilities.

With talks frozen, it seems that sabotage and Iranian determination are currently the only game in town.

Looking ahead, two main potential scenarios could play out.

The first is that the Biden administration is successful in its ability to revive the 2015 JCPOA. In light of Iran’s nuclear progress made since the Trump administration’s unilateral exit from the agreement in 2018, and the sunset clauses contained in the JCPOA that all expire between 2025 to 2031, leaving Iran to enrich as much uranium as it wants and to stockpile as much fissile material as it wants, reviving of the 2015 deal seems like no more than a temporary reprieve, which does almost nothing to solve the fundamental issues of the Iranian nuclear program.

If an agreement is signed, Iran would fill its war chest with oil trade income, and funds from other international business transactions, and be able to inject its proxies like Hezbollah with new funds, further contributing to the conventional threat to Israel and regional security.

The path to conflict from this scenario seems short.

A second scenario could involve a formal collapse of talks between the US and Iran. The talks are currently stuck on Iran’s demand to remove the IRGC from Washington’s foreign terror organization list, as well as additional Iranian demands.

This scenario could then develop into several follow-on scenarios.

The first would involve a renewed American maximum pressure campaign, designed to circumvent the diplomatic channel as a mechanism for controlling Iran’s nuclear program and to apply economic and diplomatic pressure, backed by the threat of military force.

However, the ability of the US to recruit others in the world to this campaign seems limited. It is unclear if Europe would get on board, and it is clear that Russia and China would not (unlike the pre-JCPOA round of sanctions that led to the 2015 deal).

America’s determination to reinstate a military deterrent against Iran is also highly questionable. This is due to its formal decision to prioritize great power competition with Russia and China, and to de-prioritize its Middle Eastern commitments, as the Afghanistan withdrawal and Iraqi draw-down demonstrate.

Therefore, a limited American pressure campaign seems more likely a fallout from collapsed talks, combined with an Israeli military deterrent, and possibly, stepped up Israeli covert action.

This reality would contain no guarantees against an Iranian decision to break out to full nuclear weapons capability, should Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC, and the Iranian Supreme National Security Council so choose.

It is safe to assume that Israel has marked out red lines for itself on Iranian nuclear progress which, if triggered would spark an Israeli aerial assault on key sites of the program.

That, in turn, would likely lead to full-scale conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and possibly with Shi’ite militias in Syria and Iraq, as well as Gazan terror factions.

This appeared to be the scenario drilled in the Chariots of War IDF exercise in May, the largest held by the Israeli military in decades.

Ultimately, Israel’s objective is to keep delaying the nuclear program until a fundamental change in the ideology of the Iran regime occurs, or the regime itself is replaced by a moderate successor.


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

How Israeli technology can bolster Gulf air defenses

By Yaakov Lappin

With the world firmly fixed on the Ukraine crisis and a deeply problematic nuclear agreement with Iran taking shape, there is added importance to tightening the alliance between Israel and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Recent cruise and ballistic missile, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen on Abu Dhabi, have acted as a critical reminder of the need for the UAE to bolster its air defenses. The same likely applies to other members of the GCC, mainly Saudi Arabia.

Since Israel faces a similar threat profile, its systems could significantly bolster the air defense capabilities of the GCC countries.

The UAE’s decision to purchase South Korea’s M-SAM air defense system, valued at around $3.5 billion, decreases the chances of it buying the Israeli-made, Rafael-produced, Iron Dome system, though it does not rule it out completely.

According to a Western source, Saudi Arabia and the UAE not only have the largest defense budgets, but also have the most urgent need for air defense systems.

The source said Israel could theoretically supply three types of air and missile defense systems.

 The first is Rafael’s David’s Sling air defense system. “One variation of this option is providing Rafael-made SkyCeptor interceptor missiles that can be fired from Patriot batteries,” the source explained. Patriot batteries are already in the service of Saudi and Emirati air defenses.

Israel has already offered this option to Poland in the past.   

A second option is to supply Gulf partners like the UAE with Israel Aerospace Industries’ Barak family of air defense systems, which also represent high-quality products in their long, medium, and short-range configurations, against various threats: Ballistic and cruise missiles, and attack UAVs.

The final option is Rafael’s Spyder family of short, medium, and long-range systems. Spyder is in service around the world with several clients.

It is also possible to create hybrid options between the two companies, Rafael and IAI, or other Emirati or Saudi air defense assets, by combining Spyder and Barak systems of various ranges, according to the source.

The above represents the spectrum of available interception systems that can effectively handle the new air threats posed by Iran and its proxies.

The next step would presumably involve supplying detection systems. The principal limitation in detecting low-flying attacking UAVs and cruise missiles is their detection.

Israel can sell a wide array of radars and electro-optic detection systems. It can place them on aerostats, such as IAI’s Dew of the Sky High Availability Aerostat System (HAAS), which was unveiled last year by the Israeli Defense Ministry in northern Israel.

The HAAS was developed by IAI-subsidiary Elta and was made and inflated by the US company TCOM.  Its unique radar has an outstanding performance against low-flying objects.

“This type of airship could cover the whole of the UAE’s territory,” said the Western source.

Air-based radars would certainly compliment the UAE’s existing American-made Patriot and future Korean M-Sam systems. Korean-made radars are ground-based, but tracking cruise missiles and attacking UAVs is best achieved with ‘an eye in the sky.’

The Israeli interest in supplying such systems is significantly broader than mere business interests. “Israel has a clear interest in strengthening the air defense capabilities of the UAE, Bahrain, and others in the GCC, as a fruit of the Abraham Accords,” said the source.

In general, such contracts today require not only a procurement agreement but also a willingness to work with local industries, which have evolved in Gulf countries. This type of technology transfer creates a win-win situation for both sides, the source argued.

 If Israel wishes to cooperate with the GCC states on defense, there is no doubt that focusing on air defense systems is the most comfortable way of doing this, he affirmed. Hi-tech military systems are most advanced in the areas of intelligence and air defense, the source noted.

Currently, the UAE operates American-made THAAD air defense systems, PAC (Patriot advanced capability) 2 and PAC 3 systems, and Swiss-made Sky Guard radar-directed guns. The Saudis similarly possess PAC 2 and PAC 3, THAAD, and Sky Guard 104 mm guns. The latter have reasonable capabilities but without the appropriate detection abilities are not effective against modern low-altitude threats, said the source.  

“We saw this was the case in the 2019 UAV attacks on Saudi Aramco oil sites that temporarily took out half of Riyadh’s oil export capabilities,” he noted.

 Point defense short-range air defense systems that rely on electronic jamming and laser can be suitable for defending sensitive targets.

For a city, however, it is necessary to have defense systems that can intercept at ranges of at least 10 to 20 kilometers.

The advent of long-range slow-moving UAVs with engines about as powerful as scooter motors, which nevertheless have very precise strike capabilities, represents a revolution in military attack capabilities by adversaries, said the source.

Israel, for its part, will be closely analyzing the recent attacks in the Gulf and drawing the most detailed conclusions to learn from the incidents.


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Can Israel Defeat Iran’s Precision Guided Missile Threat?

By Yaakov Lappin

BRIG. GEN. ZVIKA HAIMOVICH (IDF, RET.)

BRIG. GEN. SHACHAR SHOHAT (IDF, RET.)

Hezbollah’s precision-guided missile (PGM) arsenal is Israel’s leading conventional security threat, surpassed only by Iran’s nuclear program.

While Hezbollah is not believed to have crossed Israel’s red line on this issue—a threshold that could trigger a preemptive attack on stockpiles of PGMs on Lebanese soil—it is continually taking steps towards it.

With Iran’s help, Hezbollah has recently explored ways to manufacture PGMs in Lebanon to avoid Israel’s effective grey zone campaign to disrupt the proliferation of advanced weapons from Iran to its regional proxies.

The ability to set up an indigenous PGM production capability in Lebanon—in which Hezbollah would merely receive components and independently assemble them, rather than rely on Iran for fully-built imports—represents a truly dangerous situation that Israel cannot tolerate in light of the instability that this scenario would cause.

“We have to go back in time and ask ourselves, how did we get to this stage?” says Brig. Gen. (ret.) Zvika Haimovich, former commander of the Air Defense Forces in the Israeli Air Force and a senior research fellow at the MirYam Institute.

Haimovich notes two processes that have led to the current situation. The first is a learning process by Iran and Hezbollah. Tehran and its proxy examined the estimated 20,000 projectiles fired at Israel—most of them by Hamas in Gaza—over the past fifteen years and found that only minimal damage was caused.

“Statistical (unguided) weapons had a big cognitive effect on the public but little practical effect,” says Haimovich. The second factor he notes is the revolution in standoff guided weapons technology. Whether rocket, missile, or drone, the latest technology enables these weapons to be fired from the ground, air, or sea to accurately strike targets, creating major damage, Haimovich says.

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shachar Shohat, former Air Defense Forces Commander in the Israeli Air Force, describes PGMs as “the air force of terror organizations.”

To illustrate the difference between the threat of guided and unguided projectiles, he states: “Until now, around 25% of statistical, unguided weapons fired at populated areas were on course to their targeted areas. The entry of precision-guided munitions changes these parameters.”

Given that Iron Dome has intercepted approximately one-quarter of all incoming rockets from Gaza and is programmed to shoot down only threats heading for built up areas, the accuracy level of unguided rocket barrages is fairly clear, Shohat says, adding that “This strike level for statistical rockets of around 25% hasn’t changed since the 2006 Second Lebanon War.”

In contrast, PGMs can not only ensure that areas of interest are hit but can fire projectiles at an accuracy of between five to ten meters from the target, representing a completely new level of precision strike capability.

“If a simple rocket with a 20-kilogram warhead lands 20 meters from a building, it causes heavy damage to it. When a 250-kilogram warhead rocket accurately hits a building, it will take it apart and topple it. A 250-kilogram warhead can destroy multiple buildings,” Shohat cautions.

“What was once the reserve of a trained air force with pilots—the ability to hit precise targets, like a power station or a research center, can now be done with PGMs,” says Shohat.  “If an adversary had to fire four munitions to hit one target, today one munition is enough.”

These conclusions became clear to Iran and Hezbollah, Haimovich says, and in the decade that followed the Second Lebanon War, the shift to PGMs became apparent.

“Hamas is also trying to get PGMs into its inventory,” Haimovich warns.

“In the end, it all comes from a single catalyst—Iran. The Iranians provide the knowledge and the technology. In the past, they went for the “easy” option of transferring the missiles pre-assembled. Then they understood that these smuggling runs are discovered easily by Israel, and that Israel’s intelligence community had become far too adept at recognizing missile convoys, cargo flights, or shipments,” he adds.

“So, in the past ten years, they started with the idea of transferring knowledge to local proxies,” continues Haimovich.

Israeli officials have in past years warned about “suitcases” containing guidance kits that can be placed on unguided rockets, turning them into guided rockets. The guidance kits, complete with navigation fins, can turn powerful yet unguided rockets into precision-guided missiles.

Iran and Hezbollah have made multiple efforts to get such GPS guidance kits into Lebanon. Israel has made it abundantly clear to its enemies that if its red line on this type of proliferation is crossed, action will follow.

The reason, Haimovich explains, is because even an ability to hit a small number of key strategic targets in a war will change the course of the conflict to Israel’s considerable detriment. And that means only a small number of PGMs are sufficient to pose an intolerable threat.

“If Hezbollah decides to only hit five strategic targets with a projectile that has a 10 square meter radius accuracy in one day, that’s enough to change the picture,” notes Haimovich. “This is a changing reality. As a state, we can’t tolerate the other side having accurate weapons in big scopes that can threaten strategic assets.”

Shohat states that even if Hezbollah gets hold of the Iranian guidance kits, “we will defeat them.” However, he says, “we do not want this ‘grass’ to grow and create problems. This is a good example of Israel drawing clear red lines and doing it seriously—not just at the rhetorical level.”

Although the Iran-Hezbollah axis is continuing its efforts to create a PGM arsenal, it is doing this “much less than it would want to,” says Shohat.

And in places like Syria, used as a conduit to smuggle the weapons, “each time something gets ‘lost’ on the way” to its destination, he adds. “Most importantly, this gives Israel a better opening position on the day that a war begins. This is cutting the grass. It doesn’t mean that the grass isn’t growing, but when the war starts, the grass will be as low as possible.”

Haimovich explains that Israel’s red lines are designed to prevent two intolerable threats from materializing. The first is allowing Hezbollah to possess large numbers of accurate weapons that can threaten strategic assets such as oil refineries and power stations. “Even if these sites recover from attacks within days, the cognitive effect will be major,” he warns.

The second is the ability of Hezbollah to disrupt the IDF’s own continuous functionality. “If Hezbollah strikes air force bases, and even if it only takes five to six hours to repair the runaways, that would create a very significant effect nevertheless,” he says. “Hence, we cannot accept a reality in which the other side can impact civilian and military continuous functions. Israel must do everything that it can to reduce these enemy capabilities.”

Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles are also part of the precision strike club, explains Haimovich, regardless of whether they carry five kilograms of explosives like a UAV, or 300 kilograms like a Scud B missile.

Hezbollah is not the only nearby threat possessing these capabilities. “Hamas also has a precision project,” he adds.

Expanding Air Defenses and Preparing Preemptive Options

With PGMs giving attackers a far higher chance of destroying a selected target, the obligation for more advanced air defenses is paramount, compared to previous levels of defenses, says Shohat.

“We need more interceptors. The ‘quarter principle,’ in which we only needed to shoot down around 25% of statistics projectiles, no longer holds against PGMs,” he says. “With PGMs, we need to be able to intercept everything.”

That, in turn, has economic consequences, Shohat adds. “While the cost of air defenses should be measured in terms of the damage and losses that they prevent, not just the cost of the interception itself, it is undeniable that air defenses against PGMs are more expensive than defenses against statistical weapons,” he says.

Haimovich explains the threat of accurate weaponry “obligates us to prepare differently. Systems must be able to examine threats selectively and focus on those that form strategic threats, while still also acting as area-based defenses to protect populated areas,” he says. “This calls for a robust concept, which integrates both specific site protection with regional defense—and mutual coordination between them.”

Another challenge for air defense systems posed by PGMs, notes Haimovich, is being able to recognize and distinguish PGMs from inaccurate projectiles in a crowded sky.

“Israel has highly advanced capabilities that enable a high-level performance. Still, this is a major challenge, to pick the right threats out of a barrage of rockets, to find the needle in the haystack,” he says.

Asked to discuss the option of a preemptive attack on PGM stockpiles, Haimovich says this would be a cabinet decision and that the topic constitutes a “legitimate decision on the table of the political echelon.”

He adds that questions about what would trigger such an attack remain open, pointing to potential thresholds such as the quantity of PGMs amassed by Hezbollah. In any case, Israel is “acting all of the time to delay the need to deal with this” in the form of its grey zone campaign in Syria to disrupt weapons smuggling.

“I think that every day that passes brings us closer to the stage where we will have to deal with this threat in one way or another,” he adds.

Multiple disclosures by senior Israeli officials of PGM production sites in Beirut are part of the “cognitive” struggle by Israel to expose the other side, reveal that its activities are visible, and create both an Israeli and global consensus against PGM force build-up, he explains.

Shohat agrees that the question of a preemptive strike is very difficult to answer. Like Haimovich, he points to Israel’s preemptive campaign in Syria as “putting us in a better opening position” for the next war, meaning that the PGM threat is “less severe than it would be otherwise.”

“While no campaign delivers 100% success, I believe there have been successes here, and there is no doubt that Israel reduced the threat, in relation to its potential, in a dramatic manner,” says Shohat.

The campaign is about how much the threat can be delayed and reduced, he says, before concluding: “It prevented a very bad picture from forming, which we otherwise would have had to face. To a certain extent, the preemptive campaign is an application of the lesson that the IDF learned between 2000 to 2006, when Hezbollah was allowed to build up a large arsenal without challenge.”


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Zvika Haimovich served as Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces from 2015-2018. He was Active Defense Wing Commander during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). Read full bio here.

Shachar Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Could Gilboa Prison Escape Spark An Intifada?

By Yaakov Lappin

The dramatic escape of six Palestinian terrorists from Gilboa Prison in northern Israel on Monday carries the potential of a broader security escalation, a former defense official has cautioned.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, a former Arab-affairs adviser to seven Israeli defense ministers and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, told JNS that the breakout could lead to a chain of incidents and an escalation dynamic, although this is not a certainty.

He recalled a highly relevant precedent from the 1980s. In May 1987, six senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) security prisoners escaped from an Israeli prison in the Gaza Strip. In October of that year, a gun battle between Israeli security forces and five of the escaped prisoners erupted in Gaza’s Shejaiya neighborhood district. The cell’s members were killed, and an Israeli Shin Bet member, Victor Arajwan, was also killed in the firefight.

The PIJ to this day considers the incident to be a catalyst for the start of the First Intifada, said Hacham.

In Monday’s escape, five out of the six prisoners are PIJ terrorists convicted of taking part in deadly attacks on Israelis, while the sixth is the former commander of the Fatah-aligned Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Jenin, Zakaria Zubeidi.

All six are from the West Bank city of Jenin, which lies just across the Green Line from Gilboa Prison.

“The 1987 escape was a catalyst event ahead of the First Intifada, and today, this event also has the potential to be that type of event,” said Hacham. “Should the prisoners be killed in a firefight, this could boost the already high levels of motivation among PIJ, Hamas and Fatah-affiliated organizations in Judea and Samaria,” said Hacham, noting that this does not include the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, which maintain daily coordination with the Israel Defense Forces.

Hacham assessed that it was unlikely that the P.A. would play a role in helping Israel capture the escaped prisoners, due to the fact that security prisoners are considered to be a consensus issue of paramount importance in Palestinian society.

“The word ‘intifada’ is in the air,” said Hacham. “The escape is being perceived by Palestinians as a humiliation to Israel, just as it was in May 1987. As an event that underlines Israeli vulnerability. The event joins the incident in which 21-year-old Border Police Sgt. Bar-El Hadaria Shmueli was shot dead on the Gaza border.”

The escape also strengthens the status of PIJ as an armed faction that is at the forefront of conflict with Israel. “In Gaza, Hamas runs the Strip, but PIJ is even more virulent and ideological than Hamas is. It has no real political component. It is exclusively a terrorist-military force,” explained Hacham.

The scenario of a violent apprehension of the escaped terrorists might not only trigger violence in the West Bank, but is likely to do so in Gaza, said Hacham, leading to new arson balloon attacks on Israeli communities and possibly rocket attacks as well.

Such a sequence of events could cause “regional escalation,” he added.

While Hamas and PIJ share a command center in Gaza, “sometimes PIJ acts independently without coordinating with Hamas,” said Hacham.

‘One of many prominent failures’

“When I heard of the escape, it immediately took me more than 30 years back to 1987, in the months before the First Intifada,” said Hacham.

The only escaped security prisoner not killed in the October 1987 firefight was a terrorist named Imad Saftawi, the son of a senior Fatah member (himself later slain in 1993 in an internal Fatah power dispute). Saftawi, who was convicted of killing an Israeli Military Police officer, escaped to Egypt and from there made his way to Yasser Arafat’s PLO headquarters in Tunis.

At that time, prisoners were able to dislodge bars on their cell, climb over the barbed wires and perimeter wall, and escape the facility under the cover of darkness. The Shin Bet intelligence agency led the manhunt. Its intelligence enabled the IDF to plant an ambush for the cell in Gaza’s Shejaiya neighborhood.

One central difference between the 1987 escape and Monday’s incident is the fact that in 1987, the cell escaped into Gaza immediately, which was a “familiar, supporting environment, into which they could vanish instantly,” noted Hacham.

Hacham is in little doubt that the six escaped terrorists from Gilboa Prison received outside assistance, and that they likely walked a few kilometers before a getaway vehicle awaited them.

“I assume some of them are still in the area,” he said, assessing that some could try to cross the Green Line into the West Bank or the international border towards Jordan. Some reports speculated that they would seek to reach Lebanon.

“It will be hard for them to get into Gaza. For now, they will probably look for a hideout and seek to vanish from the radar, to evade the Shin Bet,” said Hacham, who also advised commanders of the IDF’s Southern Command.

The terrorists could potentially be hiding in Jenin’s refugee camp, which in recent days has seen PIJ gunmen hold marches and displaying their firearms in a warning to Israel against conducting raids in the area.

Hacham noted with concern the “massive outpouring of euphoria in the territories.”

He noted that the failure by the Israel Prisons Service to block cell-phone signals in the prison compound is “one of many prominent failures.” That failure likely allowed the plotters to coordinate their plans without outside helpers.

‘A morale boost for Palestinian ‘resistance’ organizations’

“This is a serious failure on the part of the IPS. But it projects onto the full Israeli defense establishment,” said Hacham.

“This is the reoccurring theme in how Palestinians are describing the event,” he continued. “People I speak into Ramallah are calling it a ‘heroic Palestinian operation,’ which has exposed Israeli security forces. Three of the terrorists were designated high-risk escape candidates. Zubeidi was a central figure from the Second Intifada. The group includes two PIJ members who are brothers. All of these were in a single cell. This looks problematic.”

The escape operation likely involved “many months of detailed planning and preparation,” said Hacham, including the tunnel digging and preparing the escape opening beyond the prison wall. Someone had to wait for them on the outside and help them find a hiding place.”

The multiple failures by the IPS in gaining intelligence about the tunnel and in adequately monitoring the activities of high-risk security prisoners were joined by negligent search activities, likely due to prison guards who did not wish to “stir the pot” and risk too much violence, he said.

The decision to incarcerate the terrorists so close to their home city of Jenin also needs to be scrutinized, he added.

“This is seen as an operational achievement and a morale boost for Palestinian ‘resistance’ organizations. They don’t only view it through the narrow lens of an escape from prison,” stated Hacham. “For Palestinians, it is a source of pride. There is now a sense of victory over the ‘Israeli war machine,” and all Palestinian factions are issuing their congratulations, not only the Islamists.”

According to Hacham, the Israeli pursuit will take two main forms. The first is at the field level, involving significant numbers of police, Border Police and IDF personnel scanning the ground and searching for escape routes, as well as clues to their location.

“The second part is the intelligence front,” he said. “The Shin Bet will focus this effort, which will be aimed at locating, surveillance and utilizing all means to get hold of reliable, precise intelligence on the circumstances of the escape and hideout locations where they could have ended up.”


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

The Shadow War Against Hezbollah's Missiles

By Yaakov Lappin

The ongoing attempt by Hezbollah and its patron Iran to build an arsenal of precision guided missiles (PGMs) in Lebanon and in Syria represents the most challenging conventional military threat to Israel’s security.

With an accuracy of within 10 meters, PGMs give Hezbollah the ability to strike strategically sensitive targets such as power plants, government buildings, military targets, commercial centers, and other potential targets. In essence, this firepower capability gives anyone who possesses it, including a non-state terror army like Hezbollah, its own version of an air force with precise bombing abilities.

In any future full-scale conflict with Hezbollah, Israeli multi-tier air defenses would, despite their high-end capabilities, be unable to provide complete protection. The combination of physical damage to life and property in a sensitive site and the boost this would give to future Hezbollah ‘victory’ narratives represents a top priority challenge to Israeli national security.

Iranian-Hezbollah efforts to set up a PGM arsenal go back several years. According to the Israel Defense Forces, in 2013, under the cover of the Syrian civil war, Iran attempted to smuggle fully assembled precision missiles from Iran to Syria. The missiles were intended for the use of Hezbollah. A series of airstrikes, attributed by the international media to Israel, thwarted those efforts.

This shadow campaign, dubbed the ‘campaign between wars’ by the Israeli defense establishment, continued in high gear in 2014 and 2015, as Hezbollah entrenched itself more deeply in Syria.

In 2016, after the campaign between wars apparently thwarted Iranian-Hezbollah efforts, Tehran adopted a new approach, based on the idea of producing PGMs on Lebanese soil, as well as converting unguided rockets already located in Lebanon into PGMs.

In order to achieve this goal, the Islamic Republic began transferring to Lebanon precision components from Iran, and rockets from the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (known by its French acronym, CERS), an Assad regime agency that develops weapons together with Iran and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s job was to assemble the ‘puzzle pieces’ together into PGMs, and to this end, it began setting up PGM conversion centers across Lebanon, including in Beirut.

The IDF says  the entire program is being managed by senior officers in the Iranian overseas Quds Force. The program is ‘nourished’ through three lines of trafficking, which were planned out by the late Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani: Via cargo flights from Iran, truck convoys, and ships.

Due to what the IDF described in a video as “various efforts,” Iran and Hezbollah struggled to manufacture PGMs or convert ‘dumb missiles’ into guided ones.

In 2019, Iran and Hezbollah again attempted to intensify these efforts, leading Israel to issue multiple warnings to Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah over the grave potential consequences of his actions.

While Nasrallah is theoretically able to convince the Iranians to ‘turn the volume down’ on the PGM project if he were to feel this was necessary, it still remains unclear to what extent Nasrallah has internalized these warnings. This, despite the fact that Hezbollah is extremely busy dealing with - and trying to exploit - Lebanon’s snowballing economic, political, and humanitarian crises.

The crumbling Lebanese state is incapable of stopping these efforts despite the enormous threat they pose to its own security.

Israel continued to expose PGM sites in Lebanon in 2020. In September of that year, for example, it listed several PGM conversion sites in the heart of Beirut, leading Nasrallah to deny the information. He then invited reporters on a dubious tour of the sites in question.

In July this year, the IDF’s Northern Command assessed that Hezbollah possesses between 130,000 to 150,000 rockets and missiles at various ranges. Hebrew media reports noted that Israel is more disturbed by the PGM project than the size of Hezbollah’s arsenal.

It is also worth noting that Hezbollah possesses a number of guided anti-ship cruise missiles, which should also be considered as PGMs. These same cruise missiles could be used to hit targets on the Israeli coastline, such as naval bases.

“The assessment in the defense establishment is that there is no need to conduct a preventative or early strike at this time, since Hezbollah does not pose an existential threat,” Kan reported on July 16. According to the assessments, Hezbollah is not interested in initiating a war in the near future against Israel.

But Hezbollah and Iran are interested in building up the PGM arsenal in Lebanon, and this creates ongoing dilemmas for Israel. From 2013 until now, Israel has apparently decided to respond to the challenge by relying on the campaign between wars.

A reported Israeli airstrike in the area of Al-Safira, southeast of Aleppo, Syria, as well as on civilian and military airports in the area, on July 19 of this year,  appeared to be the latest Israeli preventative move against the PGM program.

According to the Israeli Alma Research and Education Center, which maps out threats on the northern front, Al-Safria has a branch of the CERS agency. 

“We also know that under Iranian auspices, among other things, the precision missile project is involved there,” Alma observed following the reported airstrike. The center assessed that the strikes on Al-Safira were “intended to disrupt and harm attempts to advance the missile accuracy project,” marking what appears to be the latest development in the high stakes shadow war to prevent the radical Shi’ite axis from building Hezbollah’s ‘air force.’

It seems therefore that Israel is continuing to prioritize its activities against the PGM program, but limiting its activities to Syria, based on the common understanding that any Israeli preventative strike in Lebanon would lead to a rapid escalation with Hezbollah.

In addition, it is impossible to view Hezbollah’s PGM program in isolation from the Iranian nuclear program. Iran’s objective to become a nuclear-armed state, or a threshold nuclear state that is on the cusp of nuclear breakout, is designed to provide a nuclear umbrella over its proxies in the Middle East (in addition to creating immunity for the Iranian regime).

Under that scenario, Hezbollah would be able to threaten sensitive targets using PGMs, and enjoy the backing of a nuclear-armed ‘mothership’ state. This combination of threats would surely boost the confidence of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis, and could embolden it to launch future attacks and provocations against Israel as part of a gamble that Israeli decision makers would be deterred from responding with the appropriate level of force.

This scenario contains within it intolerable future costs, meaning that Israel must prevent it from materializing today.

If the campaign between the wars is sufficiently effective at prevention, then this is welcome news, but if it proves to be insufficient, taking preventative action that could incur a high cost today is preferable to sitting on the fence and watching the PGM threat overshadow Israel’s future.


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Pragmatic Alliances Key To Stymieing Hamas & Iran 

By Yaakov Lappin

Recent weeks have seen encouraging news for the Middle East’s radical Islamist forces. Despite the widespread destruction Hamas brought on itself and the Gaza Strip, the organization has been able to position itself as a leader of the Palestinians, seriously threatening the position of its domestic rival, the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority (PA).

Hamas paid an extremely heavy price for its actions, and the IDF, utilizing first class intelligence, launched an effective air campaign that severely degraded its capabilities. Still, Hamas is once again setting the agenda in the Palestinian arena, and proved that firing rockets until the last day of a conflict serves its radical narrative – a lesson Hezbollah is sure to take note of.

 Meanwhile, the PA is fractured, unpopular, and weak in its West Bank heartland.

At the same time, Iran is moving toward a new nuclear deal with world powers, which will likely set it on a path to becoming a nuclear breakout state by the end of the decade.

A common thread runs between these developments. Iran’s threatening activities go far beyond its nuclear program, and include subversive regional activities that have had a major influence on Gaza.

Iran’s efforts to create well-armed fundamentalist proxies and partners throughout the Middle East have been constant. The Islamic Republic nourishes them with weapons-building know-how, funds, and encouragement to destabilize the region.

This pattern includes a long-standing partnership between Iran and Hamas, which helped Hamas stockpile an arsenal of some 15,000 rockets prior to the breakout of this month’s hostilities. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Gaza’s second largest terror faction, is a direct Iranian proxy, and was armed with around 10,000 projectiles before the latest conflict began.

According to assessments in the Israel Defense Forces, 90 percent of the weapons production know-how possessed by Hamas and PIJ came from Iran. Weapons engineers from Gaza traveled to Iran for training, and brought their knowledge back to Gaza to create an entire weapons production industry, which comes at the expense of the welfare of Gaza’s two million people, which Hamas views as mere human shields for its offensive capabilities.

Iran has taught its Gazan partners to manufacture weapons independently, bypassing obstacles to arms trafficking.  

The IDF’s destruction of some 100 kilometers of underground tunnels in Gaza that were designed to let Hamas move its fighters, rockets, and missile cells underneath the Strip, out of the sight of the Israel Air Force, meant a huge loss of investment and time by Hamas. It cost Hamas’s military wing 500 thousand dollars per kilometer to dig the ‘Metro’ network.

But as the ceasefire takes hold, Hamas will inevitably seek to begin re-arming ahead of the next round. In order to break this destructive cycle, it is important to connect the dots in the wider region.

Iran is pursuing a long-term strategy to create firepower attack bases and hybrid terrorist armies throughout the Middle East. One day, these can be encouraged to attack Israel from multiple fronts simultaneously, in a bid to destroy it. This effort could happen at a time when they enjoy a ‘nuclear umbrella’ from Iran.

Israel isn’t sitting back and allowing this plan to take shape passively. Still, Iran pursues its conceptual attack framework single mindedly, despite an array of domestic troubles, and a series of setbacks, such as the assassination of Quds Force Commander, Qasem Soleimani last year.  Soleimani was the mastermind of Iran’s proxy network plan, and his vision continues to be fulfilled today.

Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran’s entrenchment efforts in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and Gazan terror factions are all part of Iran’s ‘deep crescent’ plan.

The Iranian intentions threaten many others in the Middle East beyond Israel.

 Saudi Arabia has become a regular target of Houthi ballistic missile and drone attacks on its most sensitive oil infrastructure targets, airports, and cities. A Saudi-led coalition fighting the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen has been unable to extinguish the threat.

The UAE and Bahrain are directly threatened by Iran and its proxies as well,  a fact that played a key role in their participation in the Abraham Accord normalization treaties with Israel.

These Gulf states view Israel as a frontline pillar in the regional struggle to keep Iran at bay, and seek to be part of a Saudi-Israeli coalition that can push back against Iran. The coalition building efforts took on a greater urgency after it became clear that the U.S. intends to leave the region in favor of the American strategic pivot toward facing-off against China.

 Closer to home, Jordan is deeply disturbed by the prospect of being encircled by Iranian-backed radical militias in Iraq and Syria. The Hashemite Kingdom is aware of Iran’s intentions to undermine its security as part of Tehran’s bid to gain access to the West Bank, and to weaken pragmatic Sunni states.

Egypt wishes to see a calm, stable Gaza, and has been involved in a long-term regional power struggle with Iran over the fate of the Strip. Tehran emboldens and builds up Gaza’s Islamist rulers – the same forces who until recently were accused by Cairo of destabilizing the Sinai Peninsula and cooperating with jihadists and Muslim-Brotherhood forces within Egypt.

Many had written Egypt off as a power that no longer wields influence in the Palestinian arena, but Cairo’s ability to help broker an Israel-Hamas ceasefire shows that such assessments were premature.

The Palestinian Authority, which continues to maintain daily security cooperation with the IDF in the West Bank, is particularly threatened by the Iranian-Hamas partnership. Ever since its violent eviction from Gaza in Hamas’s 2007 coup, the PA has fought daily to keep Hamas cells from threatening its grip on power in the West Bank.

The common PA-Israeli interest in repressing Hamas is what enables the daily security coordination between them — often with little fanfare.

This coordination has gone on, surviving multiple diplomatic crises. The intense diplomatic battles between the PA and the Israeli government do not reflect the security and strategic realities on the ground.

A realist strategy must involve the recognition that Israel has to strengthen moderate elements in order to weaken the Islamists, both at the local and regional levels, and Jerusalem  now has an opportunity to inject the Middle Eastern pragmatic coalition with new vigor.

It can leverage the severe blow it has dealt Hamas to kick-start a new, proactive phase of working with pragmatic partners, with whom it can face down the Iranian-led Islamist threats.

Working with pragmatic Sunni partners will act as a force multiplier for Israel’s security objectives in the region, which include achieving stability, economic development, and diplomatic progress with the Palestinians, while weakening Hamas’s hold on power in Gaza and pushing Iran away from the area.  

Acting alone, and only relying on advanced military capabilities in between rounds of conflicts is an unsatisfactory approach that fails to leverage Israel’s military achievements into broader strategic steps forward.

The recommendation by the IDF to the Israeli government, to ensure that the PA leads the Gazan reconstruction effort funding program, is a step in the right direction. Although the PA faces many problems, including corruption and internal fractures at home, setting the objective of strengthening it at the expense of Hamas must form a key Israeli objective for the Palestinian arena going forward. This means strengthening the PA in the West Bank by restarting talks with it, and looking for long-term ways to begin injecting the PA back into Gaza in order to undermine Hamas.

Recruiting Israel’s Gulf allies and their considerable ability to provide financial assistance to the Palestinians can provide a major boost to such efforts. Egypt and Jordan can play highly important roles too.

If such efforts succeed in stabilizing Gaza, that will be bad news for Iran and its pyromaniac designs. The same coalition can work together to make it clear to Iran that its regional destructive activities will face a united coalition, one that knows how to work together on counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, defense technology sharing, and in other ways.

Proactive partnership with pragmatic players will be key for Israel going forward.


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

THE BEIRUT BLAST HAS ROCKED LEBANON AND THE REGION

By Yaakov Lappin

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The tragic August 4 explosion that tore through Beirut, killing over 150 people, injuring thousands, and causing massive property damage, represents the latest tragic phase in Lebanon's destabilization and transition into failed-state status. 

As the fallout from the deadly explosion continues to reverberate, and the government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab resigned in the face of popular outrage, many Lebanese demonstrators have taken to the streets. In addition to their calls for an overhaul of the corrupt political system, which has left them poor, with little electricity, and a breakdown in basic services, the demonstrators have begun challenging Hezbollah's unrivaled status as the military and political hegemon in Lebanon. 

A domino effect of instability could see Hezbollah's position challenged in new ways, and the Iranian-backed proxy could respond with violence to protect its status.  

Yet the destabilization of the Lebanese state began long before the Beirut explosion. Lebanon has been facing a series of crises, joining a Middle Eastern club of states unable to provide basic services or an economic future for its citizens, a growing number of whom find themselves homeless, jobless, and hopeless. 

Lebanon has shown an inability to find a solution for its people, for whom the economy is the most important and pressing issue. That reality has given rise to a growing current of anti-leadership protests in Lebanon, and the protests are not sectarian in nature. Like in Iraq, the Shi'ite sector in Lebanon has seen a young generation challenging its own Shi'ite leaders. 

The involvement of the international community has also been sub-par. Inherent instability is thus the norm in Lebanon, and, like in other Middle Eastern states, Iran is a big part of the story. 

Lebanon now faces the twin crisis of economic collapse and political paralysis. 

While anger toward the government and Hezbollah was growing prior to the blast, Hezbollah still maintains a large loyalist southern Lebanese Shi'ite heartland (though some people there have joined Shi'ite voices critical of Hezbollah's actions). 

Lebanese citizens, from a variety of sectarian backgrounds, have become frustrated by the obstacles that the Iranian-backed terror-army has placed in the way of outside help. Sunni Gulf states, alarmed by the political ascendency of their arch-adversary - the Iranian-Shi'ite axis in Lebanon - stopped channeling large funds into Lebanon's banking services sector. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE, which must contend with the radical Shi'ite axis in their own backyards, have any interest in rescuing a Hezbollah-dominated Lebanese government from bankruptcy. 

In distress, Lebanon turned to the International Monetary Fund for a 10 billion dollar bailout loan. But the IMF would require changes to Lebanon's economic structure, including more transparency, and assurances that Hezbollah, which faces American sanctions, will not take charge of the funds. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has described the IMF conditions as terms "that would make the country explode" – a statement that reflects the degree to which Hezbollah holds the country hostage. 

Hezbollah, meanwhile, still maintains thousands of combatants in Syria, where they fight alongside Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias on behalf of the genocidal Assad regime.

The blast itself raises a number of questions, so far unanswered, about Hezbollah's potential linkage. The questions were well summarized by Dr. Ely Karmon, a senior research scholar at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, who examined the official version of events describing how a Moldovan-flagged cargo ship docked at Beirut port in 2013, reportedly after suffering technical problems while sailing from Georgia to Mozambique, carrying 2750 tons of ammonium nitrate. After a series of disputes and inspections, the ship was abandoned by its owners in Beirut, and its cargo was transferred to the Port's Warehouse No. 12, where it remained for several years, despite repeated requests by port authorities to dispose or resell the explosive substance contained. 

According to Karmon, questions linger over how the ship got permission to dock in Beirut in the first place, as well as why nobody contacted the company in Mozambique that allegedly ordered the explosives and paid a million dollars to the ship's owners for it. Questions over who decided to store the explosives at the port for six years, and keep it in poor conditions, have not received satisfactory answers. 

In addition, it remains unclear whether Hezbollah weapons were stored near the enormous ammonium nitrate storehouse. 

Whether or not Hezbollah is connected to the blast, what is beyond dispute is that Hezbollah terror cells, under orders to attack Israeli and Jewish targets around the world, were found in possession of tons of ammonium nitrate, including in London, Thailand, Cyprus, and Peru. The organization appears to have trafficked the substance to its sleeper cells. The Thai National Police chief found similar explosives in shipping crates, apparently for export to other destinations. 

It must also be noted that Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsor intended to set up a missile production line inside Lebanon, an initiative that resulted from Israel’s alleged,  effective, ongoing interdiction of Iranian smuggling attempts into Lebanon.  

Hezbollah now wants to convert many of its rockets into precision guided missiles in order to threaten Israeli strategic sites, a development that would cause even greater regional volatility. 

Whether or not Hezbollah negligence was linked to the Beirut blast, the tragic event underlines the obvious risk posed by the storage of explosives and weapons in the heart of crowded, built-up civilian areas – a modus operandi that Hezbollah has pioneered, and continues to implement. 


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S.

ISRAEL'S VIEW OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES: A COMPLEX PICTURE

By Yaakov Lappin & Chuck Freilich

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As tensions mount on the Israeli-Lebanese border, the role of Lebanon's official military must not be overlooked. Defining an Israeli perspective of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is more complex than meets the eye. On the one hand, as can be seen from current events, Hezbollah's growing domination of Lebanon's official military is a source of deep concern. On the other, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) maintains regular open channels of communication and coordination with the LAF, which are used to help stabilize the Lebanese – Israeli border area during sensitive times. 

Officers from the IDF's International Cooperation Unit (ICU) meet with counterparts from the LAF every few weeks, at the headquarters of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which hosts the encounters in the Lebanese town of Naqoura. 

The meetings have been successful in their goal of avoiding unintended incidents and border friction, as Operation Northern Shield (December 2018 to January 2019), which was launched to destroy a series of cross-border Hezbollah attack tunnels, has demonstrated. 

At such meetings, the military delegations display English-language presentations to one another, outlining their requirements and outstanding issues. According to former ICU head Brig. Gen. Erez Maisel, "On some days, they [the LAF] would describe us as the Enemy Defense Force. Now they just write 'Israeli Force.'" 

The LAF has raised 13 "areas of contention" with the IDF that touch on the exact location of the Blue Line. At least one of those areas was resolved through military-to-military dialogue, when the IDF offered a solution accepted by the LAF.  

At the same time, IDF commanders have expressed concern over the increasingly cooperative relationship between the LAF and Hezbollah. The LAF does not prevent Hezbollah from entering into any area it pleases and it has a protocol through which its units do not enter southern Lebanese villages without gaining prior Hezbollah approval, which makes sure to remove any incriminating evidence.  

In some cases, Hezbollah personnel wear LAF uniforms and the two even enter villages for joint patrols, which of course allows Hezbollah to prevent any attempts to truly uncover its illegal presence and reimpose Lebanese sovereignty. The cross-border Hezbollah tunnels, which Israel discovered and destroyed last year, were dug under the nose of the LAF. Hezbollah has shown off captured US military equipment, which could only have come from US aid to the LAF.

All of this has helped Hezbollah to circumvent UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which bans it from deploying armed units and weapons into southern Lebanon. The resolution sought to ensure that the LAF would be the sole military force in the region, but Hezbollah has succeeded in subverting it to give it cover for its armed presence. In fact, most villages in southern Lebanon have become bases for Hezbollah rockets and other armed positions, in many cases almost every home. 

What remains unclear is how different components within the LAF view their military's relationship with Hezbollah. 

The possibility of internal divisions appears tangible. The LAF is formally dedicated to the Lebanese state, while Hezbollah is an Iranian-sponsored Shi'ite fighting force that views the Lebanese state, ultimately, as a host to be exploited. This long-standing clash of interests within Lebanon came to the fore once again during the Coronavirus crisis, which further magnified the country's catastrophic economic troubles.

Hezbollah’s presence has not been conducive to efforts by Lebanon to secure an IMF loan, with the organization's chief, Hassan Nasrallah setting conditions for receiving the loans, and warning that a failure to adhere to them could "make the country explode." Nasrallah's fear is that the IMF's conditions for granting the loan could obstruct Hezbollah's ability to exploit Lebanon's banking system. 

For years the US has poured billions into the LAF, over $2 billion since 2005 alone, viewing it as the only force in Lebanon that might prove capable of countering Iranian influence. In addition, the U.S. says that the financial assistance has enabled the LAF to successfully repress ISIS on Lebanon's border with Syria. 

In practice, Hezbollah has long held de facto control over the LAF, which does not make decisions of consequence without its approval. Indeed, in recent years, Hezbollah has come to dominate the government of Lebanon - in reality it is the government - and is also the primary socio economic force in the country. 

The Trump administration, despite its policy of “maximum pressure” towards Iran, recently released $105 million in aid to Lebanon. In Congress, in contrast, pressure is growing to condition at least 20% of the aid to the LAF on a reduction in Hezbollah’s influence over it.  

The LAF could, in theory, fill in a vacuum left in southern Lebanon in the aftermath of a new Israel – Hezbollah war, thereby enabling the IDF to quickly withdraw after a future conflict. This has already been done in the past, and was the intent behind Resolution 1701. Hezbollah’s stranglehold over the LAF and Lebanon, as a whole, however, have proven too strong, but there are few better alternatives.  

For decades, Iran’s Hezbollah proxy has hollowed out the Lebanese state, including the LAF, creating a situation in which it becomes hard to apply leverage, because no one appears to really be in charge and all options are bad. Aid to the LAF has almost become a form of indirect assistance to Hezbollah itself, but to cut it off completely would only strengthen Hezbollah further.

In these circumstances, the Congressional legislation conditioning part of the aid to the LAF on a reduction in Hezbollah’s influence, appears to be a first step in the right direction. Lebanon does need a jolt. Growing pressure must also be brought on France and others to join the US and, more recently, Britain and Germany, in formally designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Growing pressure must also be applied on Hezbollah’s financial channels. 

Israel, for its part, should continue its efforts to document and expose Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon and especially the deployment of its forces in the south, in violation of Resolution 1701, as well as the ongoing precision guided missile program. 

For all of the criticism of Israel’s hasbara (public diplomacy), its previous efforts in this area bore fruit and can do so again.


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University.

VIDEO: Yaakov Lappin & Amir Tibon In Conversation With Mark Golub, As Featured On JBS

VIDEO: Yaakov Lappin & Amir Tibon In Conversation With Mark Golub, As Featured On JBS

Israeli journalists Yaakov Lappin (Military Analyst, Jerusalem Post) and Amir Tibon (Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, Walla News) share how their knowledge and experience shapes their view of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. With Mark S. Golub on L'Chayim