Daphne Richemond Barak

Beyond Killer Robots: How AI impacts security, military affairs

 

By Daphne Richemond Barak

For too long, the conversation on AI and militaries has been narrowly focused on autonomous weapons and the ethical issues that come with them. The time is ripe to take stock of the myriad of other ways that AI will impact security and military affairs.

Just as AI is dramatically changing a range of sectors in the civilian world, improving efficiency, reducing costs, and automating processes, there is no reason to believe that militaries, too, will not be joining the AI revolution.

Israel is a world leader in developing autonomous military capabilities, from Iron Dome interceptors to unmanned aerial vehicles to ground-based platforms – though all currently rely on human approval before kinetic firepower can be activated, in line with the values of the Israeli defense establishment.

The question of what will happen when adversaries deploy autonomous weapons that do not seek a person in the loop for approval to use lethal firepower looms on the horizon for all militaries defending democratic states.

It seems reasonable to believe that even those states that have set some limits on AI capabilities will encounter adversaries who have no qualms about doing so, putting the states that limit integrating AI for national security at a considerable disadvantage. Thus, it’s imperative for states to understand the full extent of what AI can do.

While autonomous weapons attract a lot of attention, much of the conversation about this technology is negative, causing analysts to overlook the positive application of AI in areas such as force protection and the reduction of civilian casualties.

The many benefits of artificial intelligence

Other AI functions – including optimizing chain-of-command communications, human-machine teaming in areas like logistics, and predicting adversary maneuvers – offer equally promising avenues. Many are already being developed by western militaries, including by the Israel Defense Forces.

As time goes by, military commanders will feel increasingly comfortable relying on this technology, just as consumers have in the civilian world. Whether AI is introduced in the civilian or military realm does not mean suspending human involvement or judgment, but rather, receiving a new tool to boost performance.

Military commanders will use AI to minimize the fog of war. While they will continue to make maneuver decisions, AI capabilities will augment their decision-making capabilities during battle by providing a more accurate picture of the reality on the ground and keeping to the speed of modern warfare, thanks to continuously updated sensor data.

AI technologies will also help decision-makers and analysts combat the effects of information overload, and to better organize and process growing data pools on enemy behavior. AI will not only alleviate this information clutter, but it will allow for forces to make predictions about future events and outcomes, allowing states to better prepare for war.

The use of AI to better understand an adversary is shaping up to be one of the most promising and fascinating aspects of this tool. This will enable faster, real-time gathering of information, detecting patterns, mapping out communication networks, and even better understanding of how the enemy ‘feels,’ in terms of its morale, by analyzing its language on social media and other platforms. These new AI capabilities amount to intelligence gathering 2.0.

This type of analysis can be extended to both military communications and social media activities by civilians in adversarial states, to better understand a nation’s will to fight based on societal trends on any given day. The will to fight remains the most critical factor in human warfare, and being able to identify when this will decrease, in real time, could prove enormously beneficial for decision-makers in the civilian and military worlds.

In the area of military logistics and maintenance, AI can create revolutionary cost-saving efficiency, which is why most militaries are prioritizing making progress on this front. Typically considered a more technical aspect, logistics will probably lead to the most radical changes in how militaries “do business.”

AI systems can also optimize the procurement process and automate supply chains. They can forecast the need to repair equipment and order resupplies while minimizing costs. They can also be used in personnel allocation by helping militaries figure out which soldier is best suited to what unit. And unlike other aspects of AI, these applications are unlikely to raise any significant legal or ethical issues.

AI-based technologies can also enhance the capabilities of individual soldiers, and this should not be seen as unethical or dangerous across the board. In the past, amphetamines and caffeine have been handed out to soldiers for similar purposes.

What are the applications for AI in defense?

Just as limiting blood loss and boosting resistance to extreme conditions are worthy goals to help soldiers, providing them with new situational awareness and command capabilities are equally legitimate objectives. Human enhancement calls for certain limits – but those have yet to be (publicly) set. Such limits should consider force protection and the preservation of a soldier’s autonomy to choose to undergo a given enhancement, whether it can be reversed, and if it poses long-term health risks.

At the strategic level, AI can boost the capabilities of air defense systems. Emerging weapons, such as hypersonic missiles, can avoid detection from defense systems due to their speed. Air defense systems integrated with AI processing capabilities will be able to properly detect and intercept these incoming missiles.

In the area of information warfare, AI can, of course, help fabricate deep fakes and spread misinformation. Ironically, it can also help governments quickly verify information or recognize efforts by a hostile actor at shaping public perception in a harmful or disruptive manner.

This could give NATO states an ability to know, in real-time, if Russia is trying to use fake news to destabilize its security environment and threaten the alliance.

Ultimately, such capabilities extend far beyond the area of autonomous weapons and fears of ‘killer robots.’ The security community must broaden its grasp of AI capabilities and acknowledge positive as well as disruptive AI applications.


Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Making Technology Work for Humanitarian Purposes in War

 

By Daphne Richemond Barak & Laurie Blank

Although targeting technology continues to make significant progress, it is important for governments and militaries, including Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), to consider how technology can assist civilians stuck in battle zones, facilitate communication between adversaries, and rebuild communities post-conflict.

We see already the use of apps, databases, and social media to gather and share evidence of war crimes in Ukraine, providing real-time documentation of atrocities even as the war is still ongoing. These efforts will contribute to bringing justice to the victims in international and domestic courts.

But new and emerging technologies can do so much more. Modern technology can provide a real boost to family reunification through facial recognition software and other biometric tools, enhance identification of areas that require humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance using satellite imagery, and help ensure that various fighting factions are aware, in real-time, of when and where ceasefires go into effect.

During war, any and all tools to reduce vulnerability are essential. Civilians are vulnerable to attack and starvation, internment, disease, adverse weather, and many other hardships. Combatants captured by the adversary are also vulnerable—to mistreatment, loss of rights and privileges, disappearance, and other harms.

Any tools that can minimize such vulnerabilities must be harnessed, such as the real-time databases and background checks to screen for traffickers taking advantage of displaced persons and refugees launched at the Ukraine-Poland border, or biometric identification of captured soldiers and war dead, through to proper treatment and return of personnel.

And as conflict comes to an end, uncertainty can be a substantial obstacle to progress towards peace. Imagine technological tools that could enable warring parties to verify and trust information about the position of forces, the adherence to ceasefires, or the demobilization of forces, such as blockchain and other means of securing information flows. Mitigating uncertainty can help smooth the path to peace by removing common obstacles and sources of re-escalation.

In recent months, we have worked to bring relevant stakeholders around the table to explore how technology may be channeled for humanitarian purposes as wars wind down. Policymakers, militaries, humanitarian organizations, and technology experts are all essential participants in moving beyond the limited conception of technology as a warfighting tool and beginning to harness new and emerging technologies to ameliorate the consequences of war.

Although such technologies may not appear to fit into traditional military perspectives or mission definitions at first glance, a policy shift would be easier than some may think. Israel serves as a good case study for this potential. The IDF, for example, will have to address the needs and safety of millions of civilians in the event of war breaking out in Gaza or Lebanon, and as such, this discussion is extremely relevant to it.

A number of military technologies, particularly air defense systems like Iron Dome, are already defined as defensive systems that protect and have an ultimately humanitarian mission, as are the red alert (tzeva adom) warning systems designed to notify civilians of impending rocket attacks. Well beyond the narrower mission of targeting and boosting lethality, these existing technologies open the door to inserting other humanitarian applications into the mix.

Until now, the lack of any substantive discussion about the use of technology to enhance the protection of civilian populations caught up in conflicts and facilitate the end of war has been striking. Although the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross are already using new technological capabilities for several of these purposes, and NATO has held simulations on using artificial intelligence in disasters, the conversation too often focuses on the downside of technology rather than its potential upside.

Ultimately, there are countless ways in which technology can be used to bolster protections for civilians, facilitate the end of conflict, and better inform reunification and reconstruction after the war. The ever-increasing use of technology to cope with humanitarian disasters not linked to war, such as earthquakes, major flooding, and storms, highlights the breadth of this potential.

Breaking the stigma that views technology in war as solely about attacks and lethality can enable international organizations, humanitarians, militaries, tech companies, and scholars to work together to shape this new and promising humanitarian role.


Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Prof. Laurie Blank is Clinical Professor of Law at Emory Law School. Together they co-founded the End of War Project under the auspices of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism and Emory’s Center for International and Comparative Law.

From Gaza to Ukraine: Three Principles of Underground Warfare

 

By Daphne Richemond Barak

The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine offers a timely reminder of the fact that underground passageways and facilities can be used in a wide variety of ways by both state and non-state actors, and that this form of warfare isn’t going anywhere. Tunnel detection technology improves every day, yet the appeal of tunnels remains.

Underground warfare in the Russian-Ukrainian war stands out, first and foremost, because it is used by a state (Ukraine). Since 2001, the tactic of subterranean warfare has evolved primarily in the hands of violent non-state groups like Hamas, Al Qaeda, ISIS and Hezbollah. For a state like Ukraine to make use of underground networks is somewhat unusual, if one takes a contemporary view of this old military tactic.

The Ukrainian military is using tunnels and underground facilities that are civilian infrastructure sites, not dug for military use. This enables the Ukrainians to reap the benefits of tunnels without having to dig them. In fact, they have been able to use them to hamper Russia’s offensive, most visibly in Mariupol.

In what constitutes a rather traditional use of the tactic, the Ukrainians are using tunnels to defend against a Russian land invasion. As in Syria, the civilian population was the first to go underground – particularly in subways – to seek protection from the fighting. Fighters later understood that they, too, could make use of this highly strategic terrain.

In the steel underground monster of Azovstal in Mariupol, civilians and fighters cohabited – much like in the infamous and dangerous Vietcong tunnels where women were giving birth. President Vladimir Putin, for his part, operates from major underground command-and-control structures built deep into the earth, which are not so dissimilar from underground American facilities. Ukraine does not have this level of state subterranean capabilities, but its use of the underground similarly attempts to ensure the continuity of its command-and-control structure.

One could argue that Ukraine’s use of tunnels is purely defensive. This could be contrasted with how Israel’s non-state adversaries have dug extensive networks of tunnels as a means to infiltrate Israeli territory, carry out attacks, and counter Israeli capabilities by operating underground.

But such a defensive-offensive take on the tactic would be fallacious. The first core principle of underground warfare could be summed up as such: a tunnel is a tunnel, is a tunnel. Once a tunnel exists or has been dug, it can be used for any purpose.

Hamas in Gaza, for example, used a smuggling tunnel to kidnap Gilad Schalit.

And for years, the US did not fully grasp the security risk posed by drug smuggling tunnels dug on the Mexican side of its border. Yet once a tunnel has been dug, it can be used – simultaneously or not – for smuggling or carrying out terrorist acts.

A second core principle when it comes to tunnel warfare is that every actor will use underground terrain in alignment with their capabilities. Hamas cannot build an enormous Russian-style command and control facility underground. States, therefore, tend to use tunnels differently than non-state actors.

Since 9/11, non-state belligerents have used the underground arena in challenging manners, to reestablish a degree of symmetry in asymmetrical wars.

Fighting sophisticated Western enemies that are better equipped than them has led such actors to go underground, thereby neutralizing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. For these types of actors, which include Hamas and Hezbollah, using tunnels evens out the playing field, and that is the reason for underground warfare’s unabating popularity. It serves as the great equalizer in contemporary warfare.

EVEN WHEN two states are at war, as Russia and Ukraine are, those that feel they are at a military disadvantage will fall back on tunnel use to even the field – just as Ukraine has done.

Such tactics deter or slow down Russian advances, and the idea of raiding such tunnels – let alone burning them down – is disheartening. Tunnels will not win Ukraine’s war, but they can help force the Russians to struggle and cause them to lose personnel and time. Tunnels, in this context, are a drain on the attacking force.

History of tunnels

As the Second World War was coming to an end, the Japanese resorted to tunnel warfare against American forces in the Pacific, causing significant losses among US forces and forcing more mobilization of resources.

Decades earlier, in Vietnam, the Vietcong, seeking to embarrass the Americans, attacked them from underground, causing severe casualties and a sense of helplessness. The Americans struggled to deal with this threat coming from below ground, employing B-52 bombers to carpet bomb tunnel-ridden areas.

In war, tunnels create a valuable distraction, offering those who dig them an ephemeral strategic advantage. It is no surprise that ISIS’s last stronghold was a tunnel network in northeastern Syria, or that the late ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was eventually found and killed in a tunnel during a US raid on his compound in Syria, in 2019.

Returning to the war that has taken up the world’s attention, Russia knows from fighting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the war in Syria that there is no easy way to neutralize subterranean threats.

Russia eliminated ISIS forces hiding in tunnels in Syria using ultra-violent means including the flamethrower, a weapon that burns down the tunnels and anyone inside them. This could not possibly be replicated in the urban jungle of Mariupol.

The use of tunnels in Ukraine reveals that tunnels remain a part of all wars – even between states. States must anticipate future subterranean threats and contemplate how these might differ, depending on the type of actor that uses the tactic and its military capabilities. Though tunnel warfare in Ukraine does not display a high level of innovation, this does not mean that other states will not innovate. Innovation should also come in the form of reclaiming the underground strategic environment. There is no reason why states should not exploit the underground to their advantage.

The third principle is that subterranean threats are here to stay. Technology will not significantly change this in the near future. Pakistan is digging cross-border tunnels into India, according to media reports, despite increasingly powerful Indian tunnel detection technology.

Hezbollah, for its part, has built a disturbingly complex network of tunnels and bunkers in Lebanon. It takes a considerable amount of time to excavate the hard rock, and the likelihood that the digging will be discovered is high. Yet, Hezbollah continues to see tunnels as a key part of its strategy.

On a different scale, China has built underground maritime bases, and Iran is moving parts of its nuclear program underground. It has also built underground missile cities – missile launch bases that are more than 1600 feet down below ground. Those who step up their ability to combine traditional and innovative uses of the underground will be sure to reap the benefits. Anti-tunnel technology has improved but it is unlikely to ever provide a one-size-fits-all solution.

In the meantime, tunnels will continue to exercise their appeal and unabated pull vis-a-vis states and non-states alike.


Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Handling of COVID-19 in Africa was a failure

 

By Daphne Richemond Barak

According to leading epidemiologists, getting vaccines out to the world on time, including to Africa, could prevent future mutations in the next pandemic. 

Although it might be too late now to make much of a difference given how many people have already been infected, the effort to get vaccines to the African continent on time has been a massive failure.

It’s true that many countries donated vaccines, including Israel, which despite its small size sent a million doses to African nations in December 2021. Still, according to the World Health Organization, just 11% of the population of the continent is fully vaccinated. 

The WHO said the vaccination rate needs to increase six times if Africa is to meet the 70% target set for the middle of this year. To achieve this goal, it has set up a vaccine production facility in Africa to make copies of Moderna and distribute doses across the continent. 

According to official figures, there have been 11.1 million confirmed COVID cases on the continent and 246,000 deaths. The case figures from African countries have badly underreported the full impact of the pandemic, however, as have the recorded deaths attributed to the coronavirus and its mutations. This has led some observers to claim that there was little COVID in Africa, that the continent is more resilient, or that COVID did not kill as much in Africa as it did elsewhere. 

Claims that Africa has not been affected by COVID could not be further from the truth – and we should be careful that they don’t serve as an excuse for inaction when it comes to vaccination.

ALREADY, PRIOR to the pandemic, the African continent suffered enormous vulnerabilities: climate change, armed conflict, food insecurity and health emergencies like Ebola or malaria. The pandemic has exacerbated these preexisting, often structural, vulnerabilities, adding unemployment and impeding access to humanitarian aid. The virus undoubtedly harmed efforts by humanitarian aid organizations to reach people and placed aid delivery programs on hold.

In countries like Cameroon, under-nourishment affects 10% of the population, while in Zambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe, swaths of the population suffer from lack of access to food. In Ethiopia, less than half of the population receives basic drinking water services. Levels of extreme poverty, meanwhile, remain dire in sub-Saharan Africa.

Finally, the negative effects of a pandemic are typically compounded by conflict. Ebola has shown that armed conflict makes it more difficult for any government to respond to a pandemic effectively by, for example, impeding access to affected populations and the delivery of personal protective equipment.

It is clear that the COVID pandemic has exacerbated these problems and stretched the already limited resources and capacity of some African countries. Its impact is felt beyond the health sector, magnifying existing vulnerabilities and undermining already economically unstable situations.

So whatever it is that scientists cannot understand about COVID’s impact in Africa should not come at the expense of what comes next.

With only about 11% of Africa’s population vaccinated, it is not surprising that one of the biggest mutations in the coronavirus pandemic emerged from the continent. While Omicron proved to be a less dangerous mutation, new ones are already emerging, some of which might cause higher mortality.

To put it simply, the next mutation may have different results if the world once again neglects to get vaccines to the African continent on time. In recognition of this, the WHO is taking unprecedented steps to establish vaccine production facilities in African countries. These are known as “technology transfer hubs,” and they’ve been made possible by Moderna’s tacit commitment not to enforce its patent in Africa.

SOME WILL argue that it is too late for such efforts to make much of a difference now. Serological testing in Africa has indicated that massive infection of populations already exists. For example, in Nigeria, a recent sample found that for every person who had no antibodies to the virus, 958 people did.

But learning the correct lessons now can save the world tremendous suffering in the next stages of this pandemic, or whenever the world faces the next medical challenge.

A key part of this lesson means giving technological vaccine production capacity now to countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and Egypt. That will allow them to scale up production and rapidly distribute to the rest of the continent. Having the infrastructure in place can make a big difference when the next mutation or the next pandemic comes about.

Even if immunity fades following vaccination, vaccination still plays a role in containing mutations. Building vaccination capacity is something else altogether, as it enables the allocation of resources toward the creation of dedicated infrastructure. And it can be a game-changer later.

Global action and cooperation are needed to make sure that both vaccination and efforts at building vaccination capacity continue unabated in Africa. Israel’s voice is important here: it can help with research, technology and a general understanding of what it means to plan for the next hit and enhance preparedness. Israel could also take the lead in getting states to donate vaccines to the continent in a more centralized fashion and on a grander scale. Africa needs it. 


Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Will the UAE bring change to the UN Security Council?

 

By Daphne Richemond Barak

The United Arab Emirates became a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in January and will hold the position for the next two years.

For a country that perceives itself as a world leader in multiple areas and a key regional player, the UAE’s ascension to the Security Council fits neatly with its vision of promoting innovation, inclusion, resilience and peace.

Other UAE initiatives, like sending a probe to Mars, cleverly promote the same kind of ambitions, this time on behalf of the Arab world.

The UAE’s election to the Security Council happened around the same time as the signing of the Abraham Accords in August 2020. Like the Abraham Accords, this was the result of lengthy, successful planning by Emirati leaders. Arab states seeking endorsements as nonpermanent members have traditionally sought the support of the Arab League. The UAE received this endorsement in 2012, once again showing that achieving this position was a long time in the making and not an overnight move.

This is the second time that the UAE serves on the Security Council (the last time was in 1986-87), and this represents no small achievement for the rather small state, amid over 190 UN member states.

Ambassador Lana Nusseibeh, who has been the UAE’s representative at the UN since 2013, has been a vocal promoter of women’s empowerment in diplomacy, peace and security. She has vowed to make two-thirds of her office staff women, and she is certainly a nonconformist and an interesting character, while aligning her activities closely to the UAE’s political elite. She will no doubt lead initiatives at the Security Council and influence its agenda.

This is also an opportunity for the UAE to play a more prominent role vis-à-vis other international institutions: Nusseibeh recently met with the new prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim Khan, to engage on regional and global issues.

From a geopolitical perspective, the UAE’s presence on the Security Council could be influential.

On the one hand, the UAE cannot veto resolutions, but on the other, for a resolution to pass at the council, four out of 10 nonpermanent members need to vote in favor (in addition to the concurring votes of the five permanent members, Russia, China, the UK, the US and France).

This means that the nonpermanent members have a distinct influence on the passage of resolutions.

The UAE now has an opportunity to further push the issue of the Iranian-backed Houthis, who have recently been behind a series of UAV and missile attacks on the UAE, and to seek recognition of the Houthis as a terrorist organization.

Tensions between the US and Russia can spill over into the Security Council, and the UAE may be forced to take a position on Ukraine-related issues, placing it in the spotlight. Voting on these “hot” issues could potentially embarrass Russia and China – two superpowers with which the UAE is keen to maintain proper relations. Russia is an important player in the Middle East, and the UAE will likely tread carefully on any votes regarding the evolving situation in Europe.

Ultimately, although the position on the Council affords the UAE influence, it can also be a trap when votes are called for on difficult topics that can alienate world powers.

The UAE could also use its privileged position on the Security Council to advance Palestinian issues, and perhaps to urge Israel and the Palestinian Authority to kick-start negotiations in the future.

But here, too, the UAE could face tricky situations. A resolution on Israel or on Palestinian membership at the UN, even if an unlikely scenario, would require the UAE to vote – and any vote it casts could upset fellow council members. Even abstaining, in a situation like this, is a statement.

FOR ISRAEL, the question of whether it has a new ally on the powerful Security Council is a valid one to ask. The other nine nonpermanent members include countries friendly to Israel, such as Albania, Kenya and India. Importantly, Israel has diplomatic relations with all countries currently serving on the council.

Whether or not the UAE’s position on the Security Council will alter the council’s dynamics remains to be seen, but what can be stated with more confidence is that the current composition of the council is quite favorable to Israel.

Opportunities could arise for Israel to work with the UAE on issues of common interest at the UN, from climate change to international security and pandemic readiness. Israel could also use this opportunity to share its concerns on the buildup of Hezbollah’s military capabilities in Lebanon, and the inaction of Lebanese authorities.

The big question going forward is whether the UAE’s new influence at the Security Council will, over the next two years, trickle down to the rest of the United Nations.

With three new Arab countries normalizing ties with Israel, the traditional tendency of Arab countries to vote with one another as a bloc might fade over time.

Greater sub-bloc cooperation between the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, as well as possibly Saudi Arabia, could become a feature, and not only on issues related to Israel. The arrival of the UAE on the Security Council could help kick-start this process.

There is also the possibility that this process of change could affect the infamous UN Human Rights Council.

In November 2021, a joint statement was issued at the Human Rights Council on the role of women in peace and security as part of a joint initiative of the UAE, Bahrain, Israel and Morocco. Another 51 states signed on to this historic statement. Is this a small sign of change? Quite possibly.

At the same time, it is important to remember that the UAE is highly skilled at cultivating and maintaining good relations with everyone – including Turkey and Iran. The UAE does not cut off dialogue with anyone.

The UAE can be expected to figure out how to balance opposing pressures, whether at the regional or global levels, while promoting its interests. This could make for an interesting two years at the Security Council and the General Assembly.


Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

The genius of Dubai’s EXPO: A lesson in nation-branding.

 

By Daphne Richemond Barak

With the Dubai EXPO 2020 event, the United Arab Emirates has once again displayed its innovative approach to nation-branding – one that other countries can learn from.

Every four years, a different country is selected to showcase national achievements as part of world expositions. Unlike past expos, which quickly faded from collective memory, the Dubai expo is likely to continue radiating its aura well into the future.

Thanks to sophisticated targeted messaging on traditional media platforms and social media, smart design, and high visibility, EXPO 2020 has reached a wide audience, within and outside the UAE. One hundred and ninety-two pavilions were set up to highlight national achievements and narratives. 

The Dubai EXPO features quality family entertainment, leisure outings, and ample opportunities to educate about regional and global challenges. As many as 5.6 million people had visited EXPO by the end of 2021, and many more wished they could drop by.

EXPO 2020 is built as a place of learning for adults and children alike.

Through the EXPO School Program, children can take a virtual cartoon trip around EXPO; teachers can find teaching material – and even teach the “universal language of music” thanks to the official EXPO song. Top students serve as EXPO ambassadors, contributing social media content on a regular basis.

UAE government employees were given six extra vacation days to visit the event, and entrance to EXPO was free on the UAE’s 50th National Day. EXPO is clearly the product of a highly coordinated effort by various government agencies and private organizations to create an unparalleled experience combining education, learning, culture, multiculturalism, and – as it turns out – diplomacy.

Rather unexpectedly, Dubai’s EXPO has come to function as a dynamic diplomatic platform, where decision-makers and leading thinkers regularly meet. It has become an essential stop in any official visit to the UAE, including by heads of state.

Twenty-six heads of states and presidents, including the presidents of France, Pakistan, Latvia, Turkmenistan, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the King of the Netherlands, visited their country’s pavilion at EXPO before heading for the capital. The fact that they land at Dubai’s airport makes such a visit all the more appealing.

THIS REPRESENTS a certain shift in attention from Abu Dhabi to Dubai. When Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the main two emirates, decided to unite in 1971 and establish the UAE, the meeting took place in the middle of the desert to convey the message that no emirate would dominate the other.

Since that time, Abu Dhabi has been the place where government officials and diplomats converge, while Dubai serves as the business hub of the country – a reflection of the careful equilibrium achieved between the two most influential emirates in the UAE. EXPO 2020 has – willfully or not – afforded Dubai some appeal in the diplomatic and political arena.

As such, EXPO Dubai has become a central element of the UAE’s innovative nation-branding efforts. It is part and parcel of the UAE’s efforts to position itself as a central actor in the Arab world and a key global hub.

EXPO DUBAI opened in October 2021 – following a postponement due to the COVID-19 pandemic – and is set to run until March 2022, but it will likely turn into a permanent fixture, and fulfill its out-of-the-ordinary role, in one way or another, going forward.

Its main themes – Opportunity, Mobility and Sustainability – crafted around the UN’s Sustainability Development Goals, were chosen with this long-term vision in mind. They provide some insight into EXPO’s ambitions, as well as the UAE’s worldview and priorities.

Beyond the spotlight on sustainable development goals, the UN’s presence at EXPO can be felt via the countless opportunities that EXPO offers for informal diplomacy.

The UN has created a special website for the event, and UN diplomats regularly visit the various pavilions. A model UN conference (simulating real UN work and activities) will be held during the closing week of EXPO in March 2022.

Until then, the “UN Hub” – like all other pavilions – has put together impressive programming, including cultural and diplomatic events, and workshops on UN- related issues.

Clearly, the UN has seized a unique opportunity to share its message and make itself relevant. The UN’s unprecedented engagement at EXPO has amplified and strengthened the UAE’s own forward-looking and inclusive message. 

EXPO 2020 has turned the UAE into the center of the world, the place where everything is possible – where Palestine, Iran and Israel each have a pavilion within a few meters of each other, and where Qatar (a nation subject to an embargo by Saudi Arabia and the UAE until early 2021) was able to join at the last minute.

EXPO 2020 has been shaped into a tool of nation-branding. It has helped the UAE to market itself as a nation of tolerance, and one that connects people and cultures. This is how the Gulf state colored its EXPO with its unique brush. In the midst of a worldwide pandemic, it has also succeeded in showing the world that in-person events are not only possible – they also have an irreplaceable value.

There is no doubt that EXPO Dubai will continue to make waves, and that the UAE will continue to reap the benefits of its well-thought-out nation-branding strategy.


Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

America’s Afghan withdrawal validates the Abraham Accords

 

By Daphne Richemond Barak

For the Sunni Arab states that joined the Abraham Accords and established formal ties with Israel last year, the United States’ recent exit from Afghanistan has validated their choice to partner with Israel. The Abraham Accords countries understood that the U.S. would come to play a lesser role in the region, and anticipated the need to engage with a broader set of like-minded states.

Successive American administrations, beginning with the Obama administration and continuing on to Biden, have made it clear that the U.S. no longer intends to serve as the guardian of world peace. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, diversifying relationships and alliances to ensure stability in the region has become a necessity.

The Afghanistan debacle confirms, in hindsight, that relying exclusively on a single superpower ally may not be the way of the future. Instead, the formation of new, multiple alliances based on common interests, and diversifying partnerships, must become a priority.  

The Abraham Accords enabled the Sunni states to hedge their bets, minimizing the risk of ending up with nothing due to geo-strategic changes.

As a result, when the signatory states of the Abraham Accords look at what is taking place in Afghanistan , they find confirmation that looking beyond their alliance with the U.S. was a smart strategic move.

Israel is a state with significant military power – and it is willing to use it actively against the Iranian axis, more so than any other regional state. That Israel also maintains a close alliance with Washington, and a working relationship with Russia and China, also contributed to the calibrated decision by the Arab states to sign the Accords.

The U.S., Russia, and China are important to the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, and Israel can help them transition into a new multipolar era, in which the U.S. is no longer the sole superpower actor active in the Middle East.

None of this means that the U.S. is about to vanish from the Middle East. It is likely to become a piece of the regional puzzle, rather than its central moving force, as it shifts priorities to its competition with China and its urgent domestic challenges, which have kept the Biden administration extremely busy.

The truth of the matter is that the Trump administration was not the first to pursue the policy of placing America first and foreign policy second.

The lack of an American military response to the use of chemical weapons by Syria in 2013, the lack of a military reply to the Iranian-orchestrated drone strikes on Saudi Arabian oil facilities in 2019, and the muted Biden response to Iranian strikes on commercial oil tankers in recent months, all indicate that the U.S. is consistently avoiding conflict in the region.

The Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations are more in line on this foreign policy aspect than meets the eye. Ultimately, this is what the American people want. Most American voters do not want their country to be as militarily engaged in the region as it has been, and America’s friends and allies are all recognizing and adapting to this shift.

The Afghanistan exit was not the first manifestation of this change, but it is a clear signal and a turning point.

The Qatari riddle

Another turning point, and arguably unintended consequence of the Afghanistan withdrawal, could emerge in the coming weeks, as reports of a possible Qatari decision to join the Abraham Accords have surfaced. The sophisticated – and problematic - maneuvering of Doha raises questions on how the current members of the Accords would respond to such a development.

Qatar has always posed a regional riddle, as a state that has become a specialist in hedging its bets, and supporting opposite sides simultaneously. Qatar sponsors terrorism, but also sends millions of dollars to U.N. programs for countering terrorism. This pattern, of taking one action and then its opposite, has earned it considerable clout on the international multi-lateral arena.

Qatar’s role in Afghanistan is just as paradoxical. It has smartly and carefully positioned itself as the indispensable mediator between the West and the Taliban, by establishing early ties with the Taliban, and then cultivating those links.

By 2014, the Taliban had an office in Doha, and in recent years, Qatar hosted ‘peace talks’ between the U.S. and Afghanistan current Islamist rulers. More recently, Qatar assisted in the mass U.S. evacuation from Afghanistan.

When the U.S. wants to send messages to the Taliban about the need to prevent Afghanistan from serving as a platform to attack the homeland, Doha will appear as the obvious middleman.

Ironically, the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan might therefore be the one that opens the next chapter in the history of the Abraham Accords.


Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Europe’s bystander approach to the Abraham Accords harms its own interests

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By Daphne Richemond Barak

The Abraham Accords are a game changer for the Middle East and for Europe; yet they have been met by European leaders with skepticism. This approach threatens to harm not only the region, but also Europe’s own interests.

Europe’s reaction to the historic accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain has been muted to say the least. Europe was eerily silent after Israel and the UAE signed their historic agreement. It issued a subdued welcoming statement after the Bahraini-Israeli agreement was signed. This statement included a recognition of the United States’ “positive role” in the Middle East, but made no mention of a potential role for the European Union in the aftermath of the signings.

Europe has not been able to recognize what the Accords mean for the stability and prosperity of the Middle East or how they can strengthen Europe’s long-term security.

Recent years have demonstrated that the more unstable and economically-challenged the Middle East is, the more next-door Europe feels knock-on effects, whether through uncontrolled migration of refugees fleeing war-torn regions, or the spread of radical ideology and those whom it indoctrinates.

The Abraham Accords, in contrast, serve as a stabilizing counter-force in the region, decreasing the prospects of conflict and promoting economic prosperity.

As a result, those who dismiss the Accords as a mere political maneuver lacking substance, or who describe them as a formality, are downplaying not only a major transformation of the Middle East but also an event that holds important ramifications for Europe.

Europe’s southern neighborhood, which covers significant parts of the Middle East, has long been the focus of EU action. The EU has encouraged partnerships and cooperation among states, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, invested in limiting climate vulnerability and conflict, and worked toward creating opportunities for all.

The region is currently entering a new era marked by precisely the types of opportunities that EU policies have sought to promote and implement for decades, in an effort to bolster the region and EU security. If it wishes to maintain its credibility and leadership posture in the Middle East, the EU must take a proactive role in the realization of the Abraham Accords.

The reality is that the Abraham Accords are bringing to life new forms of cooperation in an array of fields, and are therefore far more than a political move. From tourism to food security, agriculture, and education, the agreements have created a genuine thirst for change in Israel and the Gulf. Israelis and Gulf state citizens want a new friendship, and this warmth adds a human dimension to the growing diplomatic ties.

Whether critics like it or not, the Accords are therefore a game changer for the region and for Europe. Attempting to deny this fact demonstrates that a certain blindness is leading the response, fueled by political pre-conceptions, such as the fear that embracing the Accords is tantamount to abandoning the Palestinian cause and aspiration for a state.

Yet the two issues are hardly mutually exclusive. Regional normalization does not threaten the Palestinian issue, and the attempt to create such a false dichotomy is baseless and counter-productive.

The habit of placing the Palestinian issue front and center in all issues relating to the Middle East can be found in developments such as the decision by the European Court of Justice to label Israeli settlement products – an indication of the climate that dominates legal institutions within Europe.

This same desire to be protective of the Palestinian issue underlies the ambivalence toward the Abraham Accords. It can also be found in the lack of efforts by some EU members to discourage the International Criminal Court from launching a war crimes probe against Israel.  

In order for the EU to truly recognize the potential of the Abraham Accords, it must cease viewing this historic development through the prism of the Palestinian issue.

Letting go of the old narrative does not mean the international community should cease discussing the Palestinian issue, but rather, recognizing the Abraham Accords as an opportunity in that respect, too.

The EU can use the Abraham Accords to create new momentum to push the Palestinian issue toward resolution. This can be achieved by harnessing the new regional dynamics to generate fresh thinking on conflict resolution. The UAE has supported the Palestinians with generous funds for years, and to present that country as indifferent to the Palestinian people does not do justice to its record and continued efforts.

Ultimately, the Abraham Accords give a glimpse of what can happen when the Middle East stops viewing Israel as the enemy. This same positive narrative can now be pivoted toward the Palestinian issue, instead of allowing the Palestinian issue to hold back active support for the Accords.

The EU therefore has a positive role to play – and not just the United States. This can take the form of convening the UN Security Council to discuss the implications of the Abraham Accords for the Middle East and Europe, or reaching out to the Biden administration to offer the EU’s assistance to the U.S. in keeping up the momentum of regional normalization. 

Rather than making the Accords contentious, Europe can play an important role in making them a unifying event


Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.